Deep neural networks (DNNs) have shown an inherent vulnerability to adversarial examples which are maliciously crafted on real examples by attackers, aiming at making target DNNs misbehave. The threats of adversarial examples are widely existed in image, voice, speech, and text recognition and classification. Inspired by the previous work, researches on adversarial attacks and defenses in text domain develop rapidly. To the best of our knowledge, this article presents a comprehensive review on adversarial examples in text. We analyze the advantages and shortcomings of recent adversarial examples generation methods and elaborate the efficiency and limitations on countermeasures. Finally, we discuss the challenges in adversarial texts and provide a research direction of this aspect.
Fig.1: Example of attack on DNNs by DeepWordBug
: the generated adversarial example based on original one can fool DNN model make error classification from positive to negative. The recommendation score of this film will decrease if massive adversarial examples of this type are applied by competitors, resulting in a low box office. This paper presents a comprehensive survey on adversarial attacks and defenses in text domain to make interested readers have a better understanding of this concept. We first give some background about adversarial examples in section 2. In section 3 and 4, we review the adversarial attacks and defenses works in recent years respectively. The discussion and conclusion of the article is in section 5 and 6.
Background
In this section, we describe some background on adversarial examples, including representation of symbol and attack types and scenarios.
A. Adversarial Example Formulation
The function of a pre-trained text classification model F is the mapping from input set to the label set. For a clean text example x, it is correctly classified by F to ground truth label y∈Y, where Y including {1,…,k} is a label set of k classes. An attacker aims at adding small perturbations in x to generate adversarial example x ' , so that F(x ' ) = y ' (y ≠ y ' ). Generally speaking, a good x ' should not only be misclassified by F, but also imperceptible to humans, robust to transformations as well as resilient to existing defenses depending on the adversarial goals [24] . Hence, constraint conditions (e.g. semantic similarity, distance metric, etc.) are appended to make x ' be indistinguishable from x in some works and exploit it to cause classification errors like Fig. 1 .
B. Types of Adversarial Attack
Adversarial examples pose greater concern because attacks can be conducted on DNNs, even though attackers have no knowledge of target model. Accordingly, attacks can be categorized by the level of authorization about the model. Black-box. A more detailed division can be done in black-box attack, resulting in black-box attack with/without probing. In the former scenario, adversaries can probe target model by observing outputs, even if they do not know much about the model. This case can also be called a gray-box attack. In the latter scenario, adversaries have little or no knowledge on target model and they can not probe it. Under this condition, adversaries generally train their own models and utilize the transferability [8] [25] of adversarial examples to carry out an attack.
White-box. In white-box attack, adversaries have full access to target model and they can know all about model's architecture, parameters and weights. Certainly, both blackbox and white-box attacks can not change the model and training data.
According to the purpose of the adversary, adversarial attacks can be categorized as targeted attack and non-targeted attack.
Targeted attack. In this case, the generated adversarial example x ' is purposeful classified as class t which is the target of an adversary.
Non-targeted attack. In this case, the adversary only wants to fool the model and the result y ' can be any class except for ground truth y.
C. Metric
There exists an important issue that the generated adversarial texts not only be able to fool target models, but also need to keep the perturbations imperceptible. In other words, good adversarial examples should convey the same semantic meaning with the original ones so that metric measures are required to ensure this case. We describe five different kinds of measures to evaluate the utility of adversarial examples. Word Mover's Distance (WMD). WMD is a variation of Earth Mover's Distance (EMD) [26] . It can be used to measure the dissimilarity between two text documents, relying on the travelling distance from embedded words of one document to another [26] . In other words, WMD can quantify the semantic similarity between texts.
Cosine Similarity. Cosine similarity is also a computational method for semantic similarity based on word vector. For two given word vectors m = (m1, m2, …, mk) and n = (n1, n2, …, nk), the cosine similarity is:
But the limitation is that the dimensions of word vectors must be the same. Euclidean Distance. For two given word vectors m and n, the Euclidean distance is:
It is also used in image as a metric measure. Edit Distance. Edit distance is the minimum modifications to turn a string to another. And it usually refers to Levenshtein distance including insertion, deletion, replacement and so on.
In the text, intersection A∩B refers to similar words in the examples and union A∪B is all words without duplication.
D. Datasets
In order to make data more accessible to those who need it, we collect some datasets usually applied to NLP tasks and a few brief introductions are given at the same time. The data can be downloaded via the corresponding link in the footnote.
AG's News
1 : This is a news set with more than one million articles gathered from over 2000 news sources by an academic news search engine named ComeToMyHead. The provided db version and xml version can be downloaded for any non-commercial use.
DBPedia Ontology
2 : It is a dataset with structured content from the information created in various Wikimedia projects. It has over 68 classes with 2795 different properties and now there are more than 4 million instances included in this dataset.
Amazon Review
3 : The Amazon review dataset has nearly 35 million reviews spanning Jun 1995 to March 2013, including product and user information, ratings, and a plaintext review. It is collected by over 6 million users in more than 2 million products and categorized into 33 classes with the size ranging from KB to GB. Yahoo! Answers 4 : The corpus contains 4 million questions and their answers, which can be easily used in the question answer system. Besides that, a topic classification dataset is also able to be constructed with some main classes.
Yelp Reviews
5 : The provided data is made available by Yelp to enable researchers or students to develop academic projects. It contains 4.7 million user reviews with the type of json files and sql files.
Movie Review (MR)
6 : This is a labeled dataset with respect to sentiment polarity, subjective rating and sentences with subjectivity status or polarity. Probably because it is labeled by humans, the size of this dataset is smaller than others, with a maximum of dozens of MB.
MPQA Opinion Corpus
7 : The Multi-Perspective Question Answering (MPQA) Opinion Corpus is collected from a wide variety of news sources and annotated for opinions or other private states. Three different versions are available to people by the MITRE Corporation. The higher the version is, the richer the contents are. Internet Movie Database (IMDB) 8 : IMDBs is crawled from Internet including 50000 positive and negative reviews and average length of the review is nearly 200 words. It is usually used for binary sentiment classification including richer data than other similar datasets. IMDB also contains the additional unlabeled data, raw text and already processed data. SNLI Corpus 9 : The Stanford Natural Language Inference (SNLI) Corpus is a collection with manually labeled data mainly for natural language inference (NLI) task. There are nearly five hundred thousand sentence pairs written by humans in a grounded context. More details about this corpus can be seen in the research of Samuel et al [77] .
Adversarial Examples in Text
In this section, we categorize some representative adversarial attacks into three parts and illustrate them respectively. The technical details of each attack method are described and corresponding comments are given at the same time. 3.1 Non-target attacks for classification 3.1.1 Adversarial Input Sequences Papernot et al. [28] contributed to producing adversarial input sequences on Recurrent Neural Network (RNN). They leveraged computational graph unfolding [29] to evaluate the forward derivative [30] , i.e. Jacobian, with respect to embedding inputs of the word sequences. Then for each word of the input, fast gradient sign method (FGSM) [8] was used on Jacobian tensor evaluated above to find the perturbations. Meanwhile, in order to solving the mapping problem of modified word embedding, they set a special dictionary and chose words to replace the original ones. The constraint of substitution operation was that the sign of the difference between replaced and original words was closest to the result by FGSM.
Although adversarial input sequences can make long-short term memory (LSTM) [31] model misbehave, words of the input sequences were randomly chosen and there might be grammatical error.
Samanta and Mehta Attacks
Three modification strategies of insertion, replacement and deletion were introduced by Samanta et al. [32] to generate adversarial examples by preserving the semantic meaning of inputs as much as possible. Premise of these modifications was to calculate the important or salient words which would highly affect classification results if they were removed. The authors utlized the concept of FGSM to evaluate the contribution of a word in a text and then targeted the words in the decreasing order of the contribution.
But except for deletion, both insertion and replacement on high ranking words needed candidate pools including synonyms, typos and genre special keywords to assist. Thus, the author built a candidate pool for each word in the experiment. However, it would consume a great deal of time and the most important words in actual input text might not have candidate pools.
DeepWordBug
Because little attention was paid to generate adversarial examples for black-box attacks on text, Gao et al. [38] proposed a novel algorithm DeepWordBug in black-box scenario to make DNNs misbehave. The two-stage process they presented were determining which important tokens to change and creating imperceptible perturbations which could evade detection respectively. The calculation process for the first stage was as follows:
where xi was the i-th word in the input and F was a function to evaluate the confidence score. Later similar modifications like swap, substitution, deletion and insertion were applied to manipulate the important tokens to make better adversarial examples. Meanwhile, in order to preserve the readability of these examples, edit distance was used by the authors.
Interpretable Adversarial Training Text(iAdv-Text)
Different from other methods, Sato et al. [44] operated in input embedding space for text and reconstructed adversarial examples to misclassify the target model. The core idea of this method was that they searched for the weights of the direction vectors which maximized loss functions with overall parameters W as follows:
where
was the perturbation generated from each input on its word embedding vector w and d was the direction vector from one word to another in embedding space. Because αiAdvT in Eq. 3.1.7-1 was hard to calculate, the authors used Eq. 3.1.7-2 instead:
The loss function of iAdvT was then defined based on αiAdvT as an optimization problem by jointly minimizing objection functions on entire training dataset D:
Compared with Miyato et al. [45] , iAdv-Text restricted the direction of perturbations to find a substitute which was in the predefined vocabulary rather than an unknown word to replace the origin one. Thus, it improved the interpretability of adversarial examples by adversarial training. The authors also took advantage of cosine similarity to select a better perturbation at the same time.
Similarly, Gong et al. [47] also searched for adversarial perturbations in embedding space, but their method was gradient-based. Even though WMD was used by the authors to measure the similarity of clean examples and adversarial examples, the readability of generated results seemed a little poor.
TextBugger
Li et al. [46] proposed an attack framework TextBugger for generating adversarial examples to trigger the deep learning-based text understanding system in both blackbox and white-box settings. They followed the general steps to capture important words which were significant to the classification and then crafted on them. In white-box setting, Jacobian matrix was used to calculate the importance of each word as follows:
where Fy(•) represented the confidence value of class y. The slight changes of words were in character-level and word-level respectively by operations like insertion, deletion, swap and substitution. In black-box setting, the authors segmented documents into sequences and probed the target model to filter out sentences with different predicted labels from the original. The odd sequences were sorted in an inverse order by their confidence score. Then important words were calculated by removing method as follows:
The last modification process was same as that in white-box setting. In white-box scenario, the authors defined the conceptions of hot training phrases and hot sample phrases which were both obtained by leveraging the backpropagation algorithm to compute the cost gradients of samples. The former one shed light on what to insert and the later implied where to insert, remove and modify. In black-box scenario, the authors used the idea of fuzzing technique [35] for reference to obtain hot training phrases and hot sample phrases. One assumption was that the target model could be probed. Samples were fed to target model and then isometric whitespace was used to substitute origin word each time. The difference between two classification results was each word's deviation. The larger it was, the more significant the corresponding word was to its classification. Hence, hot training phrases were the most frequent words in a set which consisted of the largest deviation word for each training sample. And hot sample phrases were the words with largest deviation for every test sample.
Target attacks for classification

HotFlip
Like one pixel attack [36] , a similar method named HotFlip was proposed by Ebrahimi et al. [37] . HotFlip was a white-box attack in text and it relied on an atomic flip operation to swap one token for another based on gradient computation. The authors represented samples as one-hot vectors in input space and a flip operation could be represented by: 
The eq. 3.1.4-1 means that the j-th character of i-th word in a sample was changed from a to b, which were both characters respectively at a-th and b-th places in the alphabet.
The change from directional derivative along this vector was calculated to find the biggest increase in loss J(x, y) as follows: x  . HotFlip could also be used on character-level insertion, deletion and word-level modification. Although HotFlip performed well on character-level models, only few successful adversarial examples could be generated with one or two flips under the strict constraints.
Population-based Optimization Algorithm
Considering the limitation of gradient-based methods in black-box case, Alzantot et al. [39] proposed a population-based optimization via genetic algorithm [40] [41] to generated semantically similar adversarial examples. They randomly selected words in the input and computed their nearest neighbors by Euclidean Distance in GloVe embedding space [42] . These nearest neighbors which did not fit within the surrounding were filtered based on language model [43] scores and only high-ranking words with the highest scores were kept. The substitute which would maximize probability of the target label was picked from remaining words. At the same time, aforementioned operations were conducted several times to get a generation. If predicted label of modified samples in a generation were not the target label, the next generation was generated by randomly choosing two samples as parents each time and the same process was repeated on it. This optimization procedure was done to find successful attack by genetic algorithm. In this method, random selection words in the sequence to substitute were full of uncertainty and they might be meaningless for the target label when changed.
These attacks above for classification are either popular or representative ones in recent studies. Some main attributes of them are summarized in table 1 and instances in these literatures are in appendix A. 
Adversarial examples on other tasks
We have reviewed adversarial attacks for classification above. But what other kinds of tasks or applications can be attacked by adversarial examples? How are they generated in these cases and whether the crafted examples can be applied in another way except for attack? These questions naturally arise and the answers will be described below.
Attack on Reading Comprehension Systems
In order to know whether reading comprehension systems could really understand language, Jia et al. [48] inserted adversarial perturbations into paragraphs to test the systems without changing the true answers or misleading humans. They extracted nouns and adjectives in the question and replaced them with antonyms. Meanwhile named entities and numbers were changed by the nearest word in GloVe embedding space [42] . The modified question was transformed into declarative sentence as the adversarial perturbation which was concatenated to the end of the original paragraph. This process was call ADDSENT by the authors. Another process ADDANY was also used to randomly choose any sequence of some words to craft. Compared with ADDSENT, ADDANY did not consider grammaticality and it needed query the model several times. Certainly, both two kinds of generated adversarial examples could fool reading comprehension systems well that gave out incorrect answers. Mainly because they tried to draw the model's attention on the generated sequences. Mudrakarta et al. [49] also studied adversarial examples on answering question system and part of their work could strengthen attacks proposed by Jia et al. [48] .
Attack on Natural Language Inference (NLI) Models
Minervini et al. [50] cast the generation of adversarial examples which violated the given constraints of First-Order Logic (FOL) in NLI as an optimization problem. They maximized the proposed inconsistency loss to search for substitution sets S by using a language model as follows: (12) where [x]+ = max (0, x) and τ was a threshold on the perplexity of generated sequences. S = {X1→s1, …, Xn →sn} denoted a mapping from {X1, …, Xn} which was the set of universally quantified variables in a rule to sequences in S. p(S; body) and p(S; head) denoted the probability of the given rule, after replacing Xi with the corresponding sentence Si. The generated sequences which were the adversarial examples helped the authors find weaknesses of NLI systems when faced with linguistic phenomena, i.e. negation and antonymy.
Attack with Syntactically Controlled Paraphrase Networks (SCPNS)
Iyyer et al. [51] crafted adversarial examples by the use of SCPNS they proposed. They designed this model for generating syntactically adversarial examples without decreasing the quality of the input semantics. The general process mainly relied on the encoder-decoder architecture of SCPNS. Given a sequence and a corresponding target syntax structure, the authors encoded them by a bidirectional LSTM model and decoded by LSTM model augmented with soft attention over encoded states [52] and the copy mechanism [53] . They then modified the inputs to the decoder, aiming at incorporating the target syntax structure to generate adversarial examples. The syntactically adversarial sentences not only could fool pre-trained models, but also improved the robustness of them to syntactic variation. The authors also used crowdsourced experiment to demonstrate the validity of the generated.
Attack on Neural Machine Translation (NMT)
Belinkov et al. [57] devised black-box methods depending on natural and synthetic language errors to generate adversarial examples. The naturally occurring errors included typos, misspelling words or others and synthetic noise was modified by random or keyboard typo types. These experiments were done on three different NMT systems [58] [59] and results showed that these examples could also effectively fool the target systems. The same work was also done by Ebrahimi et al. [60] to conduct an adversarial attack on character-level NMT by employing differentiable string-edit operations. The method of generating adversarial examples was same in their previous work [37] . Compared with Belinkov et al. [57] , the authors demonstrated that black-box adversarial examples were much weaker than black-box ones in most cases.
Adversarial Examples to Measure Robustness of the Model
Apart from attacks, adversarial examples were used as a way to measure robustness of DNN models. Blohm et al. [61] generated adversarial examples to find out the limitations of a machine reading comprehension model they designed. The categories of adversarial examples included word-level and sentence-level attack in different scenarios [62] . By comparing with human performance, experiment results showed that some other attributions, e.g. answer by elimination via ranking plausibility [63] , should be added into this model to improve its performance.
Defenses of Adversarial Attack
The constant arms race between adversarial attacks and defenses invalidates conventional wisdom quickly [24] . In fact, defense is more difficult than attack and few works have been done on this aspect. In this section, we describe some methods of defenses against adversarial attacks in text. 4.1 Adversarial Training Adversarial training [8] was a usual approach to defend adversarial examples of the text type in some studies [37] [38] [39] [46] . They mixed the adversarial examples with corresponding original examples as training dataset to train the model. Adversarial examples could be detected to a certain degree in this way, but adversarial training method was not always work. In the research of [37] [38] [46] , the model had some robustness to the adversarial examples. However, it failed in the work of [39] , mainly because the different ways of generating adversarial examples. The modifications of the former were insertion, substitution, deletion and replacement, while the later took use of genetic algorithm to search for adversarial examples. From this we can see that adversarial training method is not always useful and may be only effective on its corresponding attack. This conclusion has been confirmed by Tram`er et al. [64] in image domain, but it remains to be demonstrated in text.
Spelling Check
Because the ways of modification strategy in some methods may produce misspelling words in generated adversarial examples, it naturally came up with an idea to detect adversarial examples by checking out the misspelling words. Gao et al. [38] used an autocorrector which was the Python autocorrect 0.3.0 package before the input. And Li et al. [46] took advantage of a context-aware spelling check service 13 to do the same work. But experiment results showed that this approach was effective on character-level modifications and partly useful on word-level operations. Meanwhile, the availability of different modifications was also different no matter on character-level or word-level methods.
Analysing Robustness of Adversarial Document Manipulations
With the purpose of improving the ranking robustness to small perturbations of documents in the adversarial Web retrieval setting, Goren et al. [65] formally analyzed, defined and quantified the notions of robustness of linear learning-to-rank-based relevance ranking function. They adapted the notions of classification robustness [7] [66] to ranking function and defined related concepts of pointwise robustness, pairwise robustness and a variance conjecture. To quantify the robustness of ranking functions, Kendall's-τ distance [67] and "top change" were used as normalized measures. Finally, the empirical findings supported the validity of the authors' analyses in two families of ranking functions [68] [69].
Discussion of Challenges and Future Direction
In the previous sections, a detailed description of adversarial examples on attack and defense was given to enable readers to have a faster and better understanding of this respect. Next, we present more general observations and discuss challenges on this direction based on the aforementioned contents in the form of question and answer. Q1: How does authors judge the performance of their attack methods? Generally, authors mainly evaluate their attacks on target models by accuracy rate or error rate. The lower the accuracy rate is, the more effective the adversarial examples are. And the use of error rate is the opposite. Certainly, some researchers prefer to utilize the difference in accuracy before and after attacks, because it can show the effect of attacks more intuitively. And these criterions can also used in defending of adversarial examples.
Q2: Why are misspelled words used to generate adversarial examples in some methods? The motivation by using misspelled words is similar to that in image, which aims at fooling target models with indiscernible perturbations. Some methods tend to conduct character-level modification operations which highly result in misspelled words. And humans are extremely robust against that case in written language [70] .
Q3: How are the adversarial examples generated in black-box scenario? When the adversaries have no access including probing to the target models, they train a substitute model and utilize the transferability of adversarial examples. Szegedy et al. [7] first found that adversarial examples generated from a neural network could also make another model misbehave by different datasets. As a result, adversarial examples generated in the substitute model are used to attack the target models while models and datasets are all inaccessible. Apart from that, constructing adversarial examples with high transferability is a prerequisite to evaluate the effectiveness of black-box attacks and a key metric to evaluate generalized attacks [71] .
Q4: Is there a universal approach to generate adversarial examples? Because the application of adversarial examples in text rose as a frontier in recent years, the methods of adversarial attacks were relatively few, let alone defenses. Thus, there is not a universal approach to generate adversarial examples. But in our observations, many methods mainly follow a two-step process to generate adversarial examples. The first step is to find important words which have significant impact on classification results and then homologous modifications are used to get adversarial examples.
Q5: Why is research on adversarial attacks and defenses difficult? There are many reasons for this question and one of the main reasons is that there is not a straightforward way to evaluate proposed works no matter attack or defense. Namely, the convincing benchmarks do not exist in recent works. One good performed attack method in a scenario may failed in another or new defense will soon be defeated in the way beyond defenders' anticipation. Even though some works are provably sound, but rigorous theoretical supports are still needed to deal with the problem of adversarial examples.
Q6: How can we generate better adversarial examples or construct more robust models against the attacks in the future? As an attacker, designing universal perturbations to catch better adversarial examples can be taken into consideration like it works in image [72] . A universal adversarial perturbation on any text is able to make a model misbehave with high probability. Moreover, more wonderful universal perturbations can fool multi-models or any model on any text. On the other hand, the work of enhancing the transferability of adversarial examples is meaningful in more practical back-box attacks.
On the contrary, defenders prefer to completely revamp this vulnerability in DNNs, but it is no less difficult than redesigning a network and is also a long and arduous task with the common efforts of many people. At the moment defender can draw on methods from image area to text for improving the robustness of DNNs, e.g. adversarial training [73] , adding extra layer [74] , optimizing cross-entropy function [75] [76] or weakening the transferability of adversarial examples.
Conclusion
This article presents a survey about adversarial attacks and defenses on DNNs in text. Even though DNNs have the high performance on a wide variety of NLP, they are inherently vulnerable to adversarial examples, which lead to a high degree concern about it. This article integrates most existing adversarial attacks and some defenses focusing on recent works in the literature. From these works, we can see that the threat of adversarial attacks is real and defense methods are few. More attention should be paid on the problem of adversarial example which remains an open issue for designing considerably robust models against adversarial attacks.
